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ABSTRACT 
The severity of many psychological disorders is associated with an increasing 
amount of different stimuli or situations that elicit a maladaptive response. This is 
known as the process of (over)-generalization and is often characteristic of 
individuals with emotional disorders. Recently, abstract repetitive thought has been 
proposed to be a transdiagnostic marker in several disorders (e.g., worry in anxiety; 
rumination in depression). The present study examined the impact of an abstract 
thinking style (compared to a more concrete thinking style) as a mechanism that 
contributes to generalization. Students (N=83) were trained in either an abstract or 
concrete thinking mode and then completed a learning phase and finally a 
generalization test phase. High dysphoric students showed more negative 
generalization in the abstract condition compared to the concrete condition. For low 
dysphoric participants, the two thinking styles did not result in a difference in 
generalization. Implications for the transdiagnostic value of an abstract processing 
style in depression and anxiety are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following two examples. First, a man is diagnosed with depression. He 
recently had a conflict with one of his best friends over a promise that was not kept. 
This event has touched him deeply, leading him not to trust any of his friends. His 
lack of trust has not only spread to his friends but even to his family and his wife. 
This has led him to avoid contact with other people as much as possible. Secondly, 
the neighbor’s dog bit Mark one day. His normal fear of the neighbor’s dog rapidly 
spreads to a fear of many different dogs. Now he does not only fear the neighbor’s 
dog or dogs of that same breed but even small friendly looking dogs. His fear of dogs 
escalates to the extent that even a picture of a dog elicits fear. He becomes afraid of 
leaving his house because of the chance of encountering a dog. He worries constantly 
and his fear of dogs becomes a serious impairment in his life.  
These two examples illustrate that it is maybe not so much the intensity of fear or 
bad feelings that makes those feelings detrimental to an individual’s functioning. 
Rather, many psychological problems are characterized by some form of over-
generalization (e.g., Hermans, Baeyens, & Vervliet, 2013). In the context of fear 
conditioning, generalization-conditioning paradigms have been developed to study 
generalization in humans (e.g. Lissek et al., 2008; Vervliet, Kindt, Vansteenwegen, & 
Hermans, 2010). In the depression literature, using self-report measures of 
overgeneralization (Carver & Ganellen, 1983), Carver (1998) found that negative 
overgeneralization to the self predicted subsequent depressive symptoms. In a recent 
study Fulford, Rosen, Johnson, and Carver (2012) also found a relationship between 
negative overgeneralization to the self and symptoms of anxiety. Other studies have 
found that depressed participants differ from non-depressed participants on negative 
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generalizations across situations (e.g., Klar, Gabai, & Baron, 1997; van den Heuvel, 
Derksen, Eling, & van der Staak, 2012). In this study we examine the role of another 
important transdiagnostic mechanism, namely the abstract processing of events, in 
generalization. 
The way people process events (e.g., rumination) has been singled out as one of 
the most important factors leading to a pathological outcome (Kinderman, 
Schwannauer, Pontin, & Tai, 2013). The foundational and pioneering work of Susan 
Nolen-Hoeksema has been of immeasurable value in this context.  More recently, she 
was also one of the major contributors in the area of transdiagnostic rumination 
research (e.g., McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011; Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schweizer, 2010; Nolen-Hoeksma & Watkins, 2011).   
Indeed, repetitive thinking (like rumination, but also worry) has been found to 
characterize individuals with many different psychological problems and is thus 
considered as a transdiagnostic factor (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; 
McLaughlin & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011; Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Aldao et al., 2010). 
However, not every single form of repetitive thinking has been found to be 
detrimental (Watkins, 2008). Again, in this context, Susan Nolen-Hoeksema led 
pioneering work, e.g. her work on the distinction between a maladaptive rumination 
type (brooding) and a relatively less maladaptive and in some cases even protective 
form of rumination (reflection; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). One 
(other) element of repetitive thinking that has been consistently found to be 
maladaptive is when this repetitive thinking is abstract (vs. concrete) in nature 
(Watkins, 2008).   
Watkins (2008) adopted the representations of abstract and concrete construal (or 
processing mode) of repetitive thought that originated in the cognitive literature  (e.g., 
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Trope & Liberman, 2003). “Abstract construals are general, superordinate, and 
decontextualized mental representations that convey the essential gist and meaning of 
events and actions, such as inferences of global traits that are invariant across 
different situations (e.g., “laziness”) or representations of “why” an action is 
performed and of its ends and consequences. In contrast, concrete construals are more 
low-level mental representations that include subordinate, contextual, and incidental 
details of events and actions, such as inferences of situation-specific states, such as 
“tiredness,” or representations of the specific “how” details of an action and of the 
means to an end” (Watkins, 2008, p. 187).  
The impact of adopting an abstract vs. concrete processing mode has been 
examined in several studies with different outcomes. In studies that manipulate these 
processing modes, participants in the concrete condition are typically asked to focus 
on contextual details and thus on the specific “how” details of an event (e.g., “Think 
about what you could hear, smell, touch, etc. in that situation; Moberly & Watkins, 
2006), whereas participants in the abstract condition are asked to focus on the causes, 
meanings and implications and thus on the “why” aspects of an event (e.g., “Think 
about the causes, consequences and implications for that situation”; Moberly & 
Watkins, 2006). Experimental studies have shown unconstructive consequences of an 
abstract processing mode, such as recalling more overgeneral autobiographical 
memories (Raes, Watkins, Williams, & Hermans, 2008), endorsing more global self-
judgments (Rimes & Watkins, 2005), poorer problem solving (Watkins & Moulds, 
2005), and poorer emotional recovery from prior failure (Watkins, 2004).  
Although manipulations of abstract processing have been used in different 
studies, none have looked at the impact of this processing mode on generalization. 
However, it has been posited that the mechanism by which abstract processing has its 
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unconstructive consequence may be via its impact on the degree of generalization in 
response to emotional events (Watkins, 2008); but, again, this has not yet been put to 
an experimental test. Therefore, we now directly tested this hypothesis by inducing 
participants to adopt either an abstract or concrete processing mode and afterwards 
assessed their generalization by using a generalization-conditioning paradigm 
commonly used in the context of fear generalization (e.g., Lissek et al., 2008; Vervliet 
et al., 2010). A generalization-conditioning paradigm usually consists of two phases, 
i.e., an acquisition and generalization phase. In the acquisition phase a stimulus (CS+) 
is paired with an aversive outcome (US). Next, in the generalization phase the 
response to stimuli similar to the CS+ (e.g., morphs of the CS+), but never paired 
with the US, is tested. 
In our conditioning procedure we sought to mimic the kind of generalization 
across situations seen in depression (e.g., Klar et al., 1997). After some negative 
encounters, depressed individuals will make abstraction of the specifics of the 
individual situations and (over)-generalize to situations that look (most) similar to the 
original situation. By using a conditioning paradigm with negative and neutral events 
and including an induction procedure of abstract and concrete thought that has 
previously proved to be successful (Moberly & Watkins, 2006) we aim to bridge a 
gap between the anxiety literature, in which the use of such procedures is very 
common, and the depression literature.  
We expected to observe more generalization in participants who received an 
abstract processing mode induction compared to those who received a concrete 
processing mode. However, Watkins (2008) notes that the negative consequences of 
the inductions that trigger abstract thought are often moderated by current mood. 
Consequently, studies have found that these abstract thought manipulations often only 
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have differential effects in vulnerable groups (i.e., individuals experiencing dysphoric 
mood; e.g., Watkins & Teasdale, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). This means that 
the negative effects of the abstract thought induction are mostly (or only) present for 
people who are already in a dysphoric mood or people high in the tendency to engage 
in repetitive negative thinking. Higher levels of depressive symptoms and repetitive 
negative thinking are predicted to moderate (i.e., strengthen) the relationship between 
induced abstract (vs. concrete) processing style and generalization. 
A somewhat related issue is that in general, depressed individuals show more 
generalization for negative events than do non-depressed individuals. However, for 
neutral events, Klar and colleagues (1997) found no difference in the degree of 
generalization between depressed and non-depressed participants. Consistent with 
these findings, we further hypothesized that high dysphoric participants and 
individuals high in repetitive negative thinking that are induced in an abstract thinking 
mode (vs. a concrete thinking mode) would show more generalization for stimuli with 
a closer resemblance to the original negative stimulus (i.e., negative generalization).  
 
METHOD 
Participants 
We opted to study adolescent participants because this an important age period 
concerning the onset of a first major depressive episode (e.g., Zisook et al., 2007). 
Participants were recruited from a secondary school (Sint-Jozefscollege, Aalst) in 
Flanders, Belgium. All participated without compensation. A total of 83 students (54 
boys) participated in the study. Their mean age was 16.9 years (SD = .68, age range: 
16 – 19; age info missing for two participants). The experiment in this study was 
conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the local 
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ethics committee of the University of Leuven. Written informed consent was obtained 
from all participants
1
.  
Materials 
Training materials for abstract and concrete processing mode (Moberly & 
Watkins, 2006). All participants are presented with the same six scenarios as training 
materials (three negative: “falling out”, “having a bad day-messing up”, “being new”; 
three positive: “dinner party”, “a successful job interview”, “learning to surf”). In 
both conditions, participants are asked to spend one minute concentrating on each 
scenario. Following each scenario, they are instructed to write down answers to three 
questions about the scenario to further reinforce the induced processing mode. 
Moberly and Watkins (2006) used this procedure to successfully induce the intended 
processing modes: abstract thought mode and concrete thought mode. 
In the abstract condition participants are presented with a brief description of the 
situation. For example, for the “being new” scenario, the text reads: “You arrive at the 
university and you don’t know anyone. You wander around campus and the halls. By 
the end of the first day, everyone else seemed to have formed groups and are chatting 
and laughing, but you seem to end up alone.” Participants are asked to think about this 
situation in words and most importantly to think about the causes, consequences and 
implications of each situation. The abstract thought induction is further reinforced by 
asking three questions focusing on abstract aspects of each situation (e.g., “What do 
you think about yourself at the end of the day?”,  “Why did you find it hard to talk to 
others?”, “What do you think will happen tomorrow?”). 
In the concrete thought condition participants are presented with one or more 
black and white photographs illustrating the situation. The photographs encourage a 
                                                        
1
 In Belgium, where the experiment was conducted, age of consent is 16. 
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more concrete, visual imagery-based approach to the situation. For example, for the 
“being new” scenario the photographs show a girl sitting alone on a staircase 
watching outside with people around her but the people do not notice her. Participants 
are asked to use the photographs as a starting point to form a detailed image of the 
situation, as if they are playing a movie of that situation in your head. Specifically, 
they are asked to “imagine as vividly as possible what you can see, hear, feel, touch 
and experience in that situation”. The concrete thought induction is further reinforced 
by asking three questions focusing on concrete aspects of each situation (e.g., “What 
are the other people doing?”, “What is happening outside the window?”). 
Instructions about the training of abstract and concrete thought were read out 
loud by the experimenter. In addition, participants could read the instructions on the 
first page of the booklet. As recommended by Moberly and Watkins (2006), the 
experimenter controlled the time (using a stop-watch) that could be used to think 
about the scenario (one minute) and the time spent on writing the answers to the three 
questions (one minute and 30 seconds) to ensure that each participant spent an equal 
amount of time on every scenario. 
Generalization paradigm. Stimuli. Two pictures of inside a train served as 
conditioned stimuli, the CS+ and CS- (see ‘blue’ and ‘red’ train in Figure 1). The 
generalization stimuli (GS) were seven morphs between the two CSs. We used 
specialized software (Norrkross MorphX) to form these GSs in seven gradual steps. 
Each of the seven resulting pictures served as a generalization stimulus. Figure 1 
shows the CS+ (CS-) and the resulting GSs. The GSs resemble the CS+ (CS-) but in 
seven decreasing (increasing) steps of perceptual similarity. For half of the 
participants, the ‘blue’ train served as the CS+, while in the other half the ‘red’ train 
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served as the CS+. All stimuli were presented in the middle of the computer screen on 
a black background. 
Scenarios. Following the presentation of the CS+ and CS- in the acquisition 
phase, participants heard a positive or neutral scenario of an event that took place in 
that train. Twenty scenarios (10 aversive/failure, 10 neutral) were first rated for 
valence in a pilot study. The scenarios were always matched in structure. For 
example, one of the negative/failure scenarios was as follows: “You are sitting in this 
train, and the conductor asks for your ticket. The conductor suddenly starts yelling at 
you while others are looking at you. You don’t speak his language and you only 
notice that he is really mad and that you have to pay an extra fee.” A neutral scenario, 
for example, reads: “You are sitting in this train, and the conductor asks for your 
ticket. The conductor asks something else, but you don’t speak his language. You 
excuse yourself for not speaking the language. He smiles friendly and goes along. 
You get back to watching outside.”  
The five most negatively rated failure scenarios and their neutral matches were 
chosen for the actual experiment. These failure scenarios were created to be 
depression relevant, such that they invoked situations that involved failure or other 
people laughing or being angry
2
. Scenarios were recorded with recording software by 
the first author. The recordings of all scenarios were relatively matched (i.e., range: 
16–19 seconds). The aversive/failure scenarios served as the US. Hence, the CS+ 
(e.g., the ‘blue’ train) was always paired with an aversive/failure scenario; that is, 
participants learnt that every time they supposedly sit in this ‘blue’ train something 
negative happens. The CS- (e.g., the ‘red’ train) was never followed by an aversive 
                                                        
2
 We acknowledge that such scenarios are possibly not only relevant for depression but also for 
individuals with social anxiety symptoms. However, we would argue that ‘people laughing at you’ and 
‘feeling inferior’ are situations that depressed people might also relate to. 
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scenario but always by a neutral scenario; that is, participants learnt that every time 
they supposedly sit in this ‘red’ train something neutral happens.  
US-expectancy. Participants were requested to indicate to what extent they expect 
an aversive/failure event to occur in that train on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 
(definitely NO negative event will follow) to 10 (there will definitely follow a negative 
event). This scale was presented below the picture on the computer screen. 
Participants had to move a red dot (using the left and right arrows) across the 11-point 
expectancy scale to select their desired expectancy score. They confirmed their 
answer by hitting ‘Enter’. There was no time limit for this response. 
Valence. Participants were requested to indicate to what extent the train felt as 
negative or positive to them. They were asked to not think too much about it and to 
reflect their opinion. The 11-point valence scale ranged from negative (0) to positive 
(10).  
Manipulation check. Participants were asked to rate this question: “After hearing 
each scenario you had to think in a way that you trained at the start of the experiment. 
How well were you able to do this? Indicate on the scale below. Try to judge yourself 
in an honest way.” The five-point scale ranged from not well to very well. 
Procedure of generalization paradigm. Affect 4.0 software (Spruyt, Clarysse, 
Vansteenwegen, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2010) was used to control the stimulus 
sequence, the presentation of the stimuli and the inter trial intervals. Participants 
started off with a pre-acquisition phase in which each CS was presented three times in 
a random order. They were instructed to rate their US expectancy; however, at this 
point in the experiment they had not yet experienced the US. This phase was 
primarily used to familiarize participants with the pictures.  
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After this phase, participants received instructions about the acquisition phase 
and were asked to put their headphones on to listen to the spoken scenarios 
individually. One CS (CS-) was presented five times and was always followed by a 
neutral scenario that the participants heard after they gave their US-expectancy rating 
(by pressing ‘Enter’). The other CS (CS+), also presented five times, was always 
followed by an aversive/failure event. The trials were presented in a random order. In 
total the participants had to give 10 US-expectancy ratings. After every trial they were 
instructed to think back about the train scenario in the particular mode that was 
previously trained. Thus, in the abstract condition group they were again instructed to 
think about the causes, implications and consequences of the situation. The CS 
remained on the screen for 30 seconds while the participant was thinking.  
Once participants completed the acquisition phase they could remove the 
headphones. In the generalization test phase there were two blocks of 13 trials. The 
CSs were each presented three times (never followed by a US) and the seven GSs 
(never followed by a US) were presented one time in each block. US-expectancy was 
rated in the same way as in the previous phases. In the last phase valence was 
measured for the CSs and the GSs. The CSs were each presented three times and the 
seven GSs were each presented once. After completing the valence measure, 
participants answered the manipulation check question. This was the last screen on 
the computer. Upon completion, participants were instructed to return to the booklet 
for the remaining questionnaires.  
Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ; Ehring, Zetsche, Weidacker, Wahl, 
Schönfeld & Ehlers, 2011). The PTQ is a 15-item questionnaire measuring repetitive 
negative thought that is independent of a specific content. The items assess the 
repetitiveness (e.g., The same thoughts keep going through my mind again and again), 
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intrusiveness (e.g., Thoughts just pop into my mind), difficulties to disengage (e.g., I 
can’t stop dwelling on them) and unproductiveness of recurrent negative thinking 
(e.g., I keep asking myself questions without finding an answer) as well as the degree 
to which rumination captures mental capacity (e.g., My thoughts prevent me from 
focusing on other things). The instructions read: “In this questionnaire, you will be 
asked to describe how you typically think about negative experiences or problems. 
Please read the following statements and rate the extent to which they apply to you 
when you think about negative experiences or problems.” Participants are asked to 
rate the items on a five-point scale, from 0 (never) to 4 (almost always). The PTQ has 
shown good psychometric properties (Ehring et al., 2011). In this study the Dutch 
version (PTQ-NL) was used (Ehring, Raes, Weidacker & Emmelkamp, 2012; 
Cronbach’s α = .93). The internal consistency of the PTQ-NL in this sample was good 
(α = .89). A recent study further showed that the PTQ-NL has prospective predictive 
validity for depressed mood (Raes, 2012). 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS 21). The DASS 21 is a 21-item self-
report questionnaire that measures negative emotional states of depression, anxiety 
and stress (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The depression subscale has good internal 
consistency (α = .81, Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The 7-item depression subscale 
of the Dutch version (de Beurs, Van Dyck, Marquenie, Lange, & Blonk, 2001) was 
used in this study. The instructions read: “Please read each statement and circle a 
number (0, 1, 2 or 3) which indicates how much the statement applied to you over the 
past week.” Internal consistency for the depression subscale in this sample was good 
(α = .78). Each item is scored on a four-point scale, from 0 (did not apply to me at all) 
to 3 (applied to me very much, or most of the time). 
Procedure 
ABSTRACT THOUGHT AND NEGATIVE GENERALIZATION 15 
The study was conducted in a group setting in a computer room of the school. 
Classes were randomly allocated to either the concrete or abstract processing mode 
condition. Participants gave written informed consent and received an individual 
booklet with all materials, presented in the same order. Instructions about the training 
of abstract and concrete thought were read out loud by the experimenter. In addition, 
participants could read the instructions on the first page of the booklet. After the 
training phase, participants were instructed to start the second phase (i.e., the 
generalization paradigm) on the computer, and to complete it at their own pace. When 
participants were finished with the computer task they were prompted to go back to 
the booklet for the remaining questionnaires.  
Data analysis.  
For acquisition, US-expectancy data were analyzed with a repeated measures 
ANOVA with CS type (2 levels: CS+, CS-) and Trial (1-5) as within-subject variables 
and Condition (2 levels: abstract and concrete processing mode) as a between-subject 
variable. For generalization, US-expectancy and valence data were analyzed with a 
repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (2 levels: abstract and concrete 
processing mode) as a between-subjects factor and Stimulus (9 levels: CS+, GS1, 
GS2, GS3, GS4, GS5, GS6, GS7, CS-) as a within-subject factor. DASS-Depression 
was included as a covariate. These analyses were followed by trend analyses. We 
considered it important to conduct the latter in order to test the shape of the 
generalization gradient. Quadratic or cubic trend analyses of the whole set of 9 stimuli 
would show that there might be a difference only at one end of the stimulus set, with 
the a priori hypothesis that the gradient would only show a difference between 
Conditions for vulnerable participants closest to the CS+ (i.e., showing negative 
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generalization). When a quadratic or cubic trend appeared, we opted to look at neutral 
(GS5, GS6, GS7, CS-) and negative (CS+, GS1, GS2, GS3) generalization separately.  
RESULTS 
Participant Characteristics 
Means, standard deviations, scoring ranges and correlations for all variables included 
are presented in Table 1. There were no differences between the abstract and concrete 
processing mode except that participants in the concrete condition scored higher on 
the PTQ, t(75) = 2.46, p < .05.  
Pre-acquisition 
At this stage we should expect no difference in US-expectancy between the two 
train-stimuli because they have not yet been paired with an aversive/failure event and 
this phase was only used to familiarize participants with the procedure and the 
stimuli. However, collapsed across the three trials, it seemed that the ‘red’ train at 
baseline had a marginally higher expectancy of a negative event than the ‘blue’ train, 
t(81) = 1.31, p = .07. There were no differences between the conditions of abstract 
and concrete processing mode. 
Acquisition  
A repeated measures ANOVA with CS type (2 levels: CS+, CS-) and Trial (1-5) 
as within-subject variables and Condition (2 levels: abstract and concrete processing 
mode) as a between-subject variable was conducted. The analysis showed a main 
effect of Trial, F(4,320) = 12.53, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .14, a main effect of CS type, F(1,80) 
= 51.18, p < .001, ηp
2
= .39, and a significant CS type × Trial interaction, F(4,320) = 
17.12, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .18. Contrast analyses showed no difference between CS+ and 
CS- at trial 1, t(81) < 1, but as expected, at trial 5 the US-expectancy was higher for 
the CS+ than for the CS-,  t(81) = 7.35, p < .001. There was no main effect of 
ABSTRACT THOUGHT AND NEGATIVE GENERALIZATION 17 
Condition, F(1,80) < 1, and no interaction effects with Condition. Hence, the 
acquisition did not differ for the concrete and the abstract condition (Figure 2). When 
we include DASS-Depression as a continuous between-subject variable in the model, 
the same main and interaction effects were found. However, there was a main effect 
of DASS-Depression, F(1,76) = 6.69, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .08, and a marginally significant 
DASS-Depression × Condition interaction, F(1,76) = 3.18, p = .08, ηp
2
 = .04. To 
clarify this interaction, additional analyses showed no relation between overall 
expectancy scores and DASS-Depression for individuals in the abstract condition (r = 
.11). However, for individuals in the concrete condition, there were higher overall 
expectancy scores for individuals high on DASS-Depression (r = .41, p < .05). 
Generalization Test
3
 
Results presented here are for the first block only. To include participants that 
actually learned the difference between the CS+ and CS- (in the generalization test 
phase), we selected participants with a mean score of CS+ that was higher than the 
CS-, i.e. (Mean CS+) – (Mean CS-) > 0. Fifteen participants did not acquire this 
criterion (11 in the abstract condition and 4 in the concrete condition)
4
.  
All analyses were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser method when 
sphericity was violated. A repeated measures ANOVA with Stimulus (9 levels: CS+, 
GS1, GS2, GS3, GS4, GS5, GS6, GS7, CS-) as a within-subject factor showed a main 
effect for stimulus, F(4.90, 328.50) = 104.96, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .61. Polynomial contrast 
analysis showed that there was a linear trend, F(1,67) = 305.52, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .82, 
reflecting a clear generalization curve for the sample as a whole (Figure 2).  
                                                        
3
 Because of the baseline difference in PTQ scores between conditions, we also controlled for PTQ in 
all the analysis. Importantly, the results remained the same. For simplicity, we only report the results 
here without controlling for PTQ.  
4
 The excluded participants did not differ from the included participants for demographics, PTQ, 
DASS-Depression and manipulation check. 
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We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (2 levels: abstract 
and concrete processing mode) as a between-subjects factor and Stimulus (9 levels: 
CS+, GS1, GS2, GS3, GS4, GS5, GS6, GS7, CS-) as a within-subject factor and 
included DASS-Depression as a covariate. This ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
Stimulus, F(4.90, 308.52) = 47.41, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .43. Within-subject contrasts 
showed a significant linear trend, F(1,63) = 136.77, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .69, and a 
significant cubic trend, F(1,63) = 11.18, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .15. There were no other 
significant effects, but polynomial contrasts revealed a significant cubic trend of the 
DASS-Depression × Stimulus interaction, F(1,63) = 12.45, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .17 , and a 
significant cubic trend of the DASS-Depression × Stimulus × Condition interaction, 
F(1,63) = 4.42, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .07. We hypothesized that the negative effects of the 
abstract thought induction would be most intensified for people already in a dysphoric 
mood and would be most apparent for negative generalization (i.e., more at the CS+ 
side of the gradient). Both of these cubic trends show that the differences in gradients 
are not linear and that this difference is only found at one end of the gradient and is 
dependent upon the mood of the participants. Therefore, we further analyzed negative 
and neutral generalization separately by looking at the CS+ and GS 1 through 3 for 
negative generalization, and examined GS5 through 7 and CS- for neutral 
generalization.  
Negative Generalization 
We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (2 levels: abstract 
and concrete processing mode) as a between-subjects factor and Negative Stimulus 
(CS+, GS1, GS2, GS3) as a within-subject factor and included DASS-Depression as a 
covariate. This ANOVA showed a main effect for Negative Stimulus, F(2.41, 151.97) 
= 22.09, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .26, with a significant linear trend, F(1, 63) = 42.16, p < .001, 
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ηp
2
 = .40, and a marginally significant cubic trend, F(1, 63) = 3.81, p = .06, ηp
2
 = .06. 
There was a marginally significant effect for the Condition × DASS-Depression × 
Negative Stimulus interaction, F(2.41, 151.97) = 2.47, p = .08, ηp
2
 = .04, but 
importantly polynomial contrasts revealed a significant linear trend of the interaction, 
F(1, 63) = 4.84, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .07. As hypothesized, this analysis suggests that the 
difference in generalization between the abstract and concrete processing mode 
condition, especially for participants who scored higher on DASS-Depression, 
increased with more dissimilarity from the CS+ (i.e., the original negative stimulus). 
This is reflected in a less steep generalization gradient for more dysphoric participants 
in the abstract condition for stimuli CS+ through GS3 (Figure 3).  
Neutral Generalization 
We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (2 levels: abstract 
and concrete processing mode) as between-subjects factors and Neutral Stimulus 
(GS5, GS6, GS7, CS-) as a within-subject factor and included DASS-Depression as a 
covariate. This ANOVA showed a main effect for Neutral Stimulus, F(2.40, 151.15) 
= 25.83, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .29, with a significant linear trend, F(1, 63) = 55.29, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .47 . There were no other main or interaction effects. As hypothesized, these 
findings suggest that there is no difference in neutral generalization between 
conditions. 
PTQ.  
When we included PTQ instead of DASS-Depression as a covariate, the results 
were in the same direction. However, there were no significant results. Note that the 
results might have been influenced by the baseline difference in PTQ between the 
abstract and concrete condition.  
Valence 
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A repeated measures ANOVA with Stimulus (CS+, GS1, GS2, GS3, GS4, GS5, 
GS6, GS7, CS-) as a within-subject factor showed a main effect for Stimulus, 
F(8,536) = 28.26, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .30. Polynomial contrast analysis showed a linear 
trend, F(1,67) = 51.28, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .43. Hence, there was a clear generalization 
curve for the sample as a whole. However, there were no significant interaction 
effects between Condition (between-subject) and DASS-Depression or PTQ  
(covariates). 
 
DISCUSSION 
The present study was conducted in order to examine the impact of abstract 
thought on generalization in a depression relevant conditioning procedure. We 
hypothesized that participants who received an abstract thinking mode induction 
would show more generalization than participants who received a concrete thinking 
mode induction. As previous studies have found that induction manipulations may 
only have differential effects in vulnerable/dysphoric groups (Watkins & Teasdale, 
2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins, 2008), we expected that depression score 
might influence the effect of abstract processing style on generalization (i.e., we 
predicted more generalization for dysphoric individuals). While most of the negative 
repetitive thinking literature is based on adult studies, our results are based on an 
adolescent sample, which is an important age period concerning the onset of a first 
major depressive episode (e.g., Zisook et al., 2007). Our results showed that 
participants with more depressive symptoms in the abstract induction showed more 
generalization compared to participants in the concrete induction group. Interestingly, 
this increased generalization was only found for the negative stimuli (the 
generalization train-stimuli that were closest to the original train-stimulus that was 
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always paired with a negative/failure event). This effect was not found for participants 
with lower levels of depressive symptoms. 
Klar and colleagues (1997) found that depressed individuals tend to generalize 
more across negative situations than non-depressed individuals, whereas non-
depressed individuals tend to generalize more across positive situations. No 
differences between depressed and non-depressed were found for neutral situations. In 
our study, when dysphoric participants were instructed to think abstractly about 
negative stimuli this led to negative generalization. Accordingly, participants who 
were instructed to adopt a concrete processing style showed no increased 
generalization for the negative stimuli. We found no differences in generalization to 
the neutral stimulus according to processing mode or dysphoria.  
There is evidence that depressed individuals tend to endorse a more abstract 
thinking style, especially to negative information or problems (e.g., Takano & Tanno, 
2010; Watkins & Moulds, 2007). Hence, these studies and our findings might further 
explain the difference in overgeneralization between depressed and non-depressed 
individuals for negative situations. However, it remains unclear as to how abstract or 
concrete thinking might influence generalization for positive stimuli/situations. 
Watkins (2011) posits that abstract processing might have beneficial effects when 
faced with easy (positive) or familiar situations but suggests that depressed 
individuals do not use the most adaptive mode of processing when faced with positive 
content. Related to this, a study by Marigold, Holmes and Ross (2007) showed that 
people low in self-esteem tend to identify positive events (compliments from their 
romantic partner) more concretely than participants who are high in self-esteem. This 
finding could suggest that depressed individuals might act similarly (Watkins, 2011). 
If depressed individuals indeed adopt a concrete processing style when they are faced 
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with positive stimuli or events, this could explain why non-depressed (compared to 
depressed) individuals generalized more across positive situations in Klar and 
colleagues’ study (1997). Therefore, further research could focus on positive 
generalization by using more explicit positive stimuli in a depression relevant 
generalization paradigm.  
It has been noted that little is known about cognitive (vulnerability) factors that 
influence generalization (see Hermans et al., 2013). Our study builds on the 
knowledge about one possible variable (i.e., abstract or concrete processing mode) 
that could have an impact upon generalization. In another study, Lenaert et al. (2012) 
focused on the effects of autobiographical memory specificity on generalization. They 
found that participants high in overgeneral autobiographical memory (OGM) showed 
stronger generalization (also with a US-expectancy measure) to the GSs than 
participants low in OGM. OGM is known to predict a negative development in 
depression (Raes, Hermans, Williams, Beyers, Brunfaut, & Eelen, 2006). Moreover, 
studies have found that abstract thought also leads to more overgeneral 
autobiographical memory retrieval (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Raes, Watkins, 
Williams, & Hermans, 2008). Therefore, our results might converge with the findings 
of OGM research (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Raes et al., 2008; Lenaert et al. 2012) 
because we experimentally induced participants in an abstract thinking style (also 
leading to more OGM; see Raes et al., 2008), which lead to negative generalization in 
dysphoric individuals. Hence, our results provide further evidence in support of the 
claim that an abstract thinking style is an important underlying mechanism for related 
unconstructive cognitive outcomes.    
This study has several limitations. One limitation is that the induction of abstract 
and concrete processing style was limited to six scenarios whereas the full induction 
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consists of 12 scenarios (Moberly & Watkins, 2006). This may have constrained the 
size of our effects and may account for the absence of generalization in the later 
stages of the experiment, namely for the second block and the valence measure. Also, 
our manipulation check was different to that which has been employed in other 
research using inductions of abstract and concrete processing mode
5
. Another 
limitation is that we used a community sample which was only mildly dysphoric. In 
future research it would be interesting to see whether these effects would generalize 
to, or even be stronger for currently depressed or remitted depressed patients. We 
might expect that generalization would be even greater in a depressed group when 
they are instructed to adopt an abstract processing style.  
Another limitation of the current study is that we do not have a control condition. 
We cannot make strong claims as to whether the observed effects are caused by the 
active increasing effect of abstract processing or the active diminishing effect of 
concrete processing on generalization. However, selecting a suitable control condition 
would be challenging. A no-instruction condition in which participants were not given 
a specific processing instruction  (i.e., were asked to do nothing) might simply result 
in them engaging in spontaneous rumination, making a ‘do nothing’ group very 
ambiguous as a reference group (for a similar point, see Watkins & Moulds, 2005). 
Also, because of practical constraints, participants were assigned to the respective 
conditions by class. As such, randomization occurred at the level of the classroom. 
Hence, this could have resulted in the higher repetitive negative thinking scores for 
                                                        
5
 Other studies have collected written answers to the respective abstract and concrete 
manipulations. Ratings of these answers on an abstract/concrete scale served as a 
manipulation check (e.g., Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2004). However, our 
manipulation of abstract or concrete processing mode was embedded in the 
conditioning procedure (i.e., in the acquisition task) where it was crucial that the 
participant remained fixated on the picture of the train while thinking in an abstract or 
concrete way. Therefore, participants were not able to write their thoughts down in 
our procedure. 
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the concrete condition.  
We did not find that our measure of repetitive negative thinking in interaction 
with an abstract thinking style was related to generalization. This finding could seem 
challenging because of the substantial relationship between repetitive negative 
thinking and depression. Therefore one might expect the same pattern for dysphoric 
participants as well as for participants who score highly on repetitive negative 
thinking. However, in his review, Watkins (2008) points out that only measures of 
mood might interact with the induction of abstract or concrete processing style. Also, 
the PTQ (as a measure of repetitive negative thinking) does not assess abstract 
thinking per se but measures: (1) the key features of repetitive negative thinking (i.e., 
repetitive, intrusive, difficult to engage from), (2) its perceived unproductiveness, and 
(3) the extent to which it captures mental capacity (Ehring et al., 2012). Therefore, a 
more direct measure of trait abstract thinking might be necessary to observe 
interactions with the inductions. Still, it remains very plausible that adopting an 
abstract processing style has no detrimental effects when an individual is in a neutral 
or happy mood. Watkins and Moulds (2005) note that in the absence of a significant 
negative mood, people find it harder to sustain a prolonged and meaningful abstract or 
concrete thinking style. This makes it difficult to induce either mode of processing.  
This study further emphasizes the clinical value of targeting abstract thought and 
training patients to adopt a more concrete processing style. Recent studies that 
implemented concreteness training in therapy have found positive effects on 
dysphoria (Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009) and depression (Watkins et al., 2012). 
Also, Stöber and Borkovec (2002) reported that successful cognitive therapy for 
generalized anxiety disorder produced significant reductions in abstract thinking. Our 
study promotes concreteness training as a possible valuable transdiagnostic 
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therapeutic tool because of the effect the processing styles have on generalization 
which is a common underlying factor in several emotional disorders (Hermans et al., 
2013). Future research could thus also focus on the effects that these cognitive 
therapies (concreteness training) have on (over)-generalization. 
In sum, this study found that for more dysphoric adolescents, manipulating 
processing style (abstract vs. concrete) has an impact on negative generalization in a 
human conditioning paradigm, such that a concrete thinking mode might decrease 
negative generalization. As such, our results are in line with the hypothesis that 
abstract thought is an important mechanism affecting the degree of generalization in 
response to emotional events (Watkins, 2008). To date, there are only very few 
studies that have examined cognitive factors that may influence generalization (see 
Hermans et al., 2013). We experimentally tested whether abstract thought could be 
such a possible cognitive factor that influences generalization. Our results show that 
this generalization might be one way in which abstract thought could have a negative 
impact on emotional symptoms or complaints. Hence, this study further emphasizes 
the need to study abstract processing as a potentially important (transdiagnostic) 
marker, and highlights the need to better understand the effect that this processing 
style has on generalization.  
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Figure 1. Stimuli used in the study: The CS+, the CS- and the 7 GSs, for half the 
participants, the CS+, the CS- and the corresponding GSs were reversed.  
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Figure 2. Mean US-expectancy ratings for Trial 1 – 5 in the acquisition phase and 
CS+, GS1, GS2, GS3, GS4, GS5, GS6, GS7 and CS- during the generalization test 
phase (error bars denote 1 standard error). 
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Figure 3. Mean US-expectancy ratings for CS+, GS1, GS2, GS3, GS4, GS5, GS6, 
GS7 and CS- during the generalization test phase for the abstract and concrete 
induction in a higher and lower dysphoric group based on a median-split procedure 
(error bars denote 1 standard error).  
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Table 1 
Correlations, means and standard deviations of study measures 
 1 2 3 M SD Range 
1. DASS (depression) –   6.79 6.31 0-26 
2. PTQ .39
*
 –  32.12 9.43 10-57 
3. Manipulation-check -.20 .13 – 2.75 1.10 1-5 
Abstract M (SD) 7.00 
(7.33) 
29.59 
(9.74) 
2.66 
(1.12) 
      
Concrete M (SD) 6.56 
(5.09) 
34.71 
(8.46) 
2.85 
(1.09) 
      
Notes: 
*
p < .001. All p-values are two-tailed.  
 
